Andre du Pisani is Professor of Politics at the University of Namibia. He writes in his personal capacity.
THERE is a tendency amongst local political analysts to argue that Namibia is an exceptional case on the grounds of the nature of the country’s transition from violent conflict to peace, and from a racial oligarchy to a functioning multi-party democracy.
While the transition two decades ago was indeed remarkable in some respects, the governance challenges of Namibia are no different from those faced by a great many other new democracies. One of these challenges remains: how to balance legitimacy or popular support for the governing party and its policies, with greater effectiveness in governance performance.
This challenge is by no means unique to Namibia, but arguably, takes on special salience, because since independence in 1990, the governing party, SWAPO Party of Namibia, articulated the vision of a messianic party.
This was so, because the Party has always and continues to envision a future, particularly for the marginal members of society that would in material and social terms transcend the unjust and unequal legacies of more than a century of colonial rule.
What this means, is that change and transition are often defined by what it is not.
The overwhelming legitimacy (popular support) enjoyed by the governing party has yet to translate into effective governance performance for many Namibians that find themselves on the margins of life and the economy – the unemployed, the landless, the uneducated. Yet there is hope even beyond the promise of utopia.
At the heart of the governing party’s victory and manifesto is the promise and hope for improved service delivery at every level – national, regional and local – to all members of the Namibian society; the hope to give more meaningful voice to ordinary citizens in the governance of the country than hitherto; and the hope for propoor development as implied by the idea of a developmental state.
Added to this is the hope of meaningful decentralization and more coherent and effective policy implementation and service delivery. Yet the challenge of consolidating the institutional and human capacities of the state and what it will take to deliver on recent and past electoral promises, remains.
State capacity, both functionally and in human terms, is the antidote to messianic expectations of transformative change embodied in the political rhetoric of the governing party. Two decades after independence, the challenges are typical of the situation in most new democracies.
Without legitimacy such democracies cannot become more effective; lacking effectiveness their legitimacy may suffer over time. In essence, this challenge pivots on governance capacity and organization.
In the case of South Africa, for example, Roger Southall describes that country since the transition of 1994, as an instance of deficit in “ideational capacity” (Southall, 2007:19), that is, the degree to which the state has invested in its own legitimacy and effectiveness to realize the noble ideals contained in the manifesto of the governing African National Congress (ANC).
The gap between “saying and doing” becomes more difficult to bridge, with corruption becoming a permanent feature of the new democracy. Is it much different in the case of Namibia?
With a seeming inability to create jobs?
Improving both the relevance and quality of the education system?
Refocusing the budget in support of pro-poor growth and service delivery?
As argued above, Namibia is not unique in this. These are growing concerns, worldwide, for most young democracies. State capacity requires appropriate planning-, policy- and implementation capacities, for executing government programmes and policies against a set of realistic targets.
State institutional capacity also means the manner in which democratic institutions such as parliament, the judiciary and regional and local authorities function, as well as the extent to which effective citizen engagement and input to policy are constitutive of the capacity of the state.
The challenge is manifested in different forms, depending on the particular time and context of the democracy in question, but it is a common thread in all democracies.
• Notes: Southall, R (2007) “The ANC state, more dysfunctional than developmental?” in S Buhlungu, J Daniel, R Southall & J Lutchman (Eds.) State of the nation: South Africa 2007. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
